

Making the Geographic Turn: Researching and Teaching Early-Modern British and World History¹

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Introduction

The framework for the history curriculum at secondary schools in Great Britain is set to be “globalized” in 2015, at least according to a news report posted to a professional college-essay writing website and U.K. news sites. With less emphasis on British history and more on world history, “this new comprehensive and holistic coverage also aims toward eliminating the widespread phenomena of very subtle British xenophobia, education officials say - this reluctance to learn about things that are un-British which has resulted from years of Brit-centered learning.”² Given the diverse population that Britain has in the 21st century, what is “un-British” is up for grabs but in terms of the history framework it seems to mean foreign and non-white. As Michael Goddard³ says, the hope is that learning about the Caribbean, India, China, the Middle East, and other regions would equip modern Britons whose ancestors may or may not have emigrated from those places “to flourish in the global world”⁴ – a global world that not only

¹ While I agree with Peter Coclanis that the term “early modern” is “a complicated concept [that] is not readily, much less seamlessly, transferable beyond the West,” after reading scores of articles debating the use of “early modern” to describe areas outside the West, I am persuaded by David Washbrook’s defense of the term because it expresses “involvement in common ‘Eurasian’ processes which contributed to the emergence of ‘modernity’ in western Europe.” While debating the characteristics of modernity is well beyond its scope, this article does explore common Afro-Eurasian and Afro-Euro-American processes which formed early modernity in Britain. Peter A. Coclanis, “Atlantic World or Atlantic/World?,” *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 63, 4 (October 2006): 726; David Washbrook, “India in the early modern world economy: modes of production, reproduction and exchange,” *Journal of Global History* 2 (2007): 87, footnote 2.

² “British History Core Curriculum Globalized for 2015,” <https://www.professays.com/news/british-history-core-curriculum-globalized-for-2015/>. Compare *The Telegraph* 19 May 2014 Graeme Paton story “Less time for ‘Hitler and the Henrys’ in history A-level” at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/10841616/Less-time-for-Hitler-and-the-Henrys-in-history-A-level.html> (all accessed January 10, 2015).

³ He is Head of History for the Oxford, Cambridge, and Royal Society for the Arts’ Exam Board.

⁴ “History Core Curriculum.”

includes Britain but is now in Britain. This new emphasis on studying world history outside Britain was the outcome of a huge public struggle in Britain after the Conservative Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove announced major educational reforms in 2011 with increased emphasis on traditional (white) British history.⁵ Critics were concerned about the proposed linear narrative that created a teleological account of national destiny reminiscent of an Edwardian bestseller for children, “Our Island Story,” that emphasized British exceptionalism and autonomous development and downplayed migration to and from the island.⁶ Historian Richard Evans called it “a Little England version of our national past, linked to an isolationist view of our national future... a mindless regression to the patriotic myths of the Edwardian era.”⁷ While the framework emphasized the coherent development of Britain, it approached world history outside Britain in a fragmented way.⁸ Depending on grade level, students would “be taught about significant individuals such as Elizabeth I and Queen Victoria, Christopher Columbus and Neil Armstrong... study the history of a non-European society that provides a contrast with British history [up to 1300 CE],... Britain and her Empire... [and] key events in world history such as the French Revolution, the American Wars of Independence and the two World Wars.” Except for the study of selected ancient and modern empires and a one-time “contrast” with a non-European society before 1300 CE, the framework seems very focused on

⁵ Graeme Paton, “British history to be put back on the curriculum, says Gove,” *The Telegraph*, Nov 24, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/8912789/British-history-to-be-put-back-on-the-curriculum-says-Gove.html> (accessed January 10, 2015). See Peter Mandler’s detailed chronology in the Royal Historical Society’s May 2014 Newsletter: <http://royalhistsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/RHSNewsletterMay2014.pdf> (accessed January 10, 2015).

⁶ C. Alexander, J. Chatterji, and D. Weekes-Bernard, *Making British Histories: Diversity and the National Curriculum* (London: Runnymede Trust, 2012), 3.

⁷ As cited in Niall Fergusson, “On the teaching of history, Michael Gove is right,” *The Guardian*, February 15, 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/15/history-teaching-curriculum-gove-right> (accessed January 10, 2015).

⁸ Department for Education November 11, 2013 blog post, “Rigorous new history curriculum teaches the history of Britain through the ages,” https://community.tes.co.uk/national_curriculum_2014/b/history/archive/2013/11/21/national-curriculum-in-england-history.aspx (accessed January 10, 2015).

“the West” and endogenously driven development in Britain with little outside influence on that development after the Norman Conquest.⁹

The expectations and curriculum at major universities are mixed. The suggested introductory reading list in English history for entering students at King’s College, Cambridge University gazes almost exclusively inward and consists of older texts.¹⁰ Greater breadth is suggested in studies of particular societies and epochs and works of general interest but the focus is generally on Europe. Judging by the themes, texts, and topics, the reading lists for examination papers on English/British history at Cambridge tend to isolate Britain from the world. The main exceptions concern foreign policy and imperial policy which tend to emphasize the impact of Britain overseas rather than the impact of exogenous forces in shaping English/British history.¹¹ In contrast, the Modern British Studies program at the University of Birmingham wants to move beyond “the traditional narration of a ‘national story’” and looks to treat “Britain not in isolation nor as an Imperial centre, but as a nodal point in dynamic systems of transnational and global exchange” but its focus is on the period after 1850, leaving earlier periods of English/British history untouched.¹² A newly published textbook by U.S. historians of Britain is aimed at U.S. students but, given its publisher, it could find its way into British

⁹ Department for Education, “Statutory Guidance National curriculum in England: history programmes of study,” November 21, 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-curriculum-in-england-history-programmes-of-study/national-curriculum-in-england-history-programmes-of-study> (accessed January 10, 2015).

¹⁰ King’s College, Cambridge University, History reading list for prospective students, <http://www.kings.cam.ac.uk/study/undergraduate/offerholders/reading-lists/history.html> (accessed January 10, 2015).

¹¹ See Cambridge University, Faculty of History, Tripos Papers reading lists, <http://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/undergraduate/tripos-papers/part-i-papers-for-2013-2014/reading-lists> (accessed January 2, 2015).

¹² University of Birmingham, Centre for Modern British Studies, “Modern British Studies at Birmingham Working Paper No. 1,” February 2014, <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/mbs/working-papers/index.aspx> (accessed January 10, 2015), 1-2.

classrooms. While it still focuses on largely endogenous sources of change in early-modern Britain, it strives to situate British history within a global perspective.¹³

However, many historians of England and Britain continue to research and write early-modern English and British history (ca. 1450-ca. 1750) within a framework that emphasizes endogenous (autochthonous) nation-building, with some asides regarding overseas explorations, markets, and conquests¹⁴ but treated them, in the words of David Armitage, “as extraterrestrial histories divorced from the domestic history of Britain.”¹⁵ The promisingly titled journal *Britain and the World* goes so far as to reduce world history to British history. Out of roughly sixty articles published from 2008 to 2014, the majority (33) were on Britain’s impact on the world (mainly via imperialism) followed by articles on Britain (14). While some of the articles attempt to make “British imperial history less exclusively British,”¹⁶ the editorial weight of the journal leans toward a diffusionist view of global history in which influences flow from a Britannic center: “But there can be no doubt as to Britain’s central role as the proximate cause of the modern world configuration ...”¹⁷ and the “British World model of history... explains why the world is western.”¹⁸ In the last twenty years some historians have begun to reconceive and integrate early-modern English and British history into regional and global history without positing a one-way relationship from Britain to the world. They reject what could be called “a

¹³ Stephanie Barczewski, John Eglin, Stephen Heathorn, Michael Silvestri, and Michelle Tusan, *Britain since 1688: A Nation in the World* (London & New York: Routledge, 2015), ix, 2.

¹⁴ See, for example, the vast majority of contributions in such standard works as *A Companion to Eighteenth-Century Britain*, H. T. Dickinson, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) where even empire is treated as exogenous to the main contours of British history and those by John Morrill and Paul Langford in *The Oxford History of Britain*, Expanded Edition, Kenneth O. Morgan, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹⁵ David Armitage, “Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?” *The American Historical Review* 104, 2, (April 1999): 438.

¹⁶ Mark Hampton and James R. Fichter, “The Cultural British World: Asia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” *Britain and the World* 5.2 (2012): 175–182.

¹⁷ Gregory A. Barton, “Editorial Introduction: What is the British World?” *British Scholar* 2.2 (March 2010): 178.

¹⁸ Gregory A. Barton, “The British World Model of World History,” *Britain and the World* 5.1 (2012): 9.

methodological nationalism.”¹⁹ These historians, especially David Armitage, Maxine Berg, Peter Coclanis, Alison Games, and Miles Ogborn have begun to influence the researching and teaching of early-modern British history by embedding it in a larger narrative that involves world history. It is worth noting that none of these authors were on the Cambridge University suggested readings in English or British history. The next section of this article critically summarizes the major empirical findings and theoretical framings of these researchers while the third section explores three early 18th-century maps of Herman Moll and the final section proposes ways to teach these researchers’ new and original ideas for “globalizing” the teaching of early-modern British history to students using Moll’s maps.

Early-Modern British History as Regional and World History

Armitage and Games were pioneers (along with Bernard Bailyn) in what has come to be known as “British Atlantic History.”²⁰ Each expressed dissatisfaction with the limitations imposed on interpretive scope by a strictly national approach to English and British history and turned to Atlantic history as a way embed British history into a regional, transnational, and international spatial framework that expanded the questions asked and answered about English and British history especially regarding practices that did not stop at the boundaries of nation-states: the forced and voluntary migration of people, the movement of ideas of sovereignty, empire, and rights, the circulation of commodities and diseases, and cultural contacts and conflicts.²¹ Games did not regard Atlantic history as restricted to the Atlantic basin but as

¹⁹ The term comes from Bernhard Struck, “Introduction: Space and Scale in Transnational History,” *The International History Review* 33, 4 (December 2011): 573-584. See page 575.

²⁰ Alison Games, *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Alison Games, “Introduction, Definitions, Historiography: What Is Atlantic History?,” *OAH Magazine of History* 18, 3 (April 2004); Douglas R. Egerton and Alison Games, *The Atlantic World: A History, 1400 - 1888* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007); David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds. *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

²¹ David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” in *British Atlantic*, eds. Armitage and Braddick; Games, “Introduction,” 4-6. For a divergent view of Atlantic history that stresses comparison of differences and similarities © 2018 *The Middle Ground Journal* Number 17, Fall 2018 <http://TheMiddleGroundJournal.org>
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extending to the Great Lakes and the western coast of the Americas and into the interior of Africa if those areas were involved in processes originating in the Atlantic. An “Atlantic perspective” explains “transformations, experiences, and events in one place in terms of conditions deriving from that place’s location in a large, multifaceted, interconnected world”²² and made an explicit case for the salience of a “geographic turn” in historical studies.

Despite, or perhaps because of, Armitage’s and Games’ expansive view of Atlantic history, critics raised important issues. Eliga Gould commented that it involved unstable and anachronistic nomenclature, uncertain boundaries, and “far flung clusters of neo-European ‘islands’” of settlement.²³ Peter Coclanis, an early critic of Atlantic history,²⁴ thinks that “the levels of explanatory power and analytic acuity possible via the Atlantic history paradigm are beguiling but ultimately confining because the stratagem artificially limits the field of vision of its devotees, often blinding them to processes, developments, and conditions of central importance to understanding their figurative little corner of the world.”²⁵ One of his concerns has to do with leaving discussion of pan-European and Asian developments out of Atlantic history and he has worked to bring a global perspective to his work in U.S. history.²⁶ Pushing the Atlantic paradigm further into the realm of world history is Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra and

over connections and interactivity see Jack Greene, “Hemispheric History and Atlantic History,” in Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, eds., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

²² Games, “Introduction,” 3. On the value of teaching U.S. history in relation to Caribbean history see Alison Games, “History without Borders: Teaching American History in an Atlantic Context,” *Indiana Magazine of History* 91 (June 1995).

²³ Eliga Gould, “Comparing Atlantic Histories,” *Reviews in American History* 38, 1 (March 2010): 9, 11.

²⁴ Peter A. Coclanis, “Drang Nach Osten: Bernard Bailyn, the World-Island, and the Idea of Atlantic History,” *Journal of World History* 13, 1 (Spring 2002): 169-182; Peter A. Coclanis, ed., *The Atlantic Economy during The Seventeenth And Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005). For a trenchant discussion of his concerns and a list of many of the early important works in Atlantic history see Coclanis, “Atlantic World.”

²⁵ Coclanis, “Atlantic World,” 726;

²⁶ Coclanis, “Drang Nach Osten,” 176-180; Coclanis, “Atlantic World,” 727-735. For his “global turn” see David L. Carlton and Peter A. Coclanis, *The South, The Nation, and The World: Perspectives on Southern Economic Development* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003); Francesca Bray, Peter A. Coclanis, Edda Fields-Black, and Dagmar Schaefer, eds., *Rice: Global Networks and New Histories* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

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Philip J. Stern along with Armitage and Games who have become more critical of a purely Atlantic view of British history.²⁷ Games' more recent work²⁸ trace the networks or "webs" by which many Englishmen, especially merchants, government appointees, and clergymen, roamed an emerging empire, developing a holistic, global view of it and applying experiences garnered in Asia to their activities in America and vice versa.

Maxine Berg and Miles Ogborn have promoted a global approach to British history without having been very involved with the Atlantic paradigm.²⁹ Berg argues in a 2004 article that global trade with Asia, especially in fashion and luxury items, fostered a new consumer culture in Britain which stimulated imitative British production of those goods via steam-powered technology (i.e., the industrial revolution) and drew on the resources and markets of empire to do so.³⁰ Cheap and well-made Indian textiles tailored to the British market and tastes changed the material culture of Britain and posed a threat to the British textile industry and, following Prasannan Parthasarathi, Berg argues that global trade relations fostered new technologies and new consumer goods (product innovation through imitation) in Britain and

²⁷ David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, "Some Caveats about the "Atlantic" Paradigm," *History Compass* 1 (2003): 1-4; Philip J. Stern, "British Asia and British Atlantic: Comparisons and Connections," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 63, 4 (October 2006): 693-712; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra and Erik R. Seeman, eds., *The Atlantic in Global History, 1500-2000*, (Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2007); Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). See also H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke, and John G. Reid, eds., *Britain's Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c. 1550-1850* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) as a further attempt, following Coclanis' critique, to cast historians' gazes beyond the confines of the British Atlantic in order to explain developments there better and to develop the comparative side of Atlantic history along with its connective side.

²⁸ Alison Games, "Beyond the Atlantic: English Globetrotters and Transoceanic Connections," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 63, 4 (October 2006): 675-692; Alison Games, "England's Global Transition and the Cosmopolitans Who Made It Possible," *Shakespeare Studies*, 35 (2007): 24-31; Games, *Web of Empire*.

²⁹ Maxine Berg, "From Globalization to Global History," *History Workshop Journal* 64 (2007): 335-340; Miles Ogborn, *Global Lives: Britain and the World, 1550-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Maxine Berg, *Writing the History of the Global: Challenges for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

³⁰ Maxine Berg, "In Pursuit of Luxury: Global History and British Consumer Goods in the Eighteenth Century," *Past & Present* 182 (February 2004):85-142.

enabled it to take a different development path from early-modern India.³¹ Connections between Britain and Africa (acacia tree gum) and the Americas (dyestuffs) were also involved³² and, while fully acknowledging British inventiveness and resources, Berg places the world's first steam-powered industrial revolution in a larger global context that shows its distinctiveness and its derivation: "Paradoxically, in imitating Asian consumer goods, perceived in Europe as luxuries, the British achieved what was actually an Asian success story – the new, quality, semi-luxury consumer goods produced with advanced industrial techniques. But the British techniques... were distinctive and the goods were new products."³³ Her study is a good case study of how global connections and interactions promote heterogeneity and distinctiveness as much if not more than convergence and uniformity.

Employing larger temporal and spatial scales than Games, Ogborn examines the historical geography of the British Empire, showing how Britain and the world became connected in new ways from the Elizabethan to the late Georgian era and how British culture and landscapes were transformed as people, ideas, and material objects moved across the globe. The "global lives" of the book's title refer to a large-scale dialectic in which global processes shaped individual human lives and actions in the early-modern world and the individual actions of these separate lives flowed together, across, and against each other to create and sustain those larger processes. In a thinly disguised paraphrase of Marx, Ogborn writes that he constructs each life so that "individuals are seen acting in situations that, in varying degrees, are not of their own choosing."³⁴ His other general point is that global history and the history of the British Empire are intimately bound up with questions of geography.

³¹ Berg, "Pursuit," 90.

³² *Ibid.*, 132-141.

³³ *Ibid.*, 130.

³⁴ Ogborn, *Global Lives*, 11.

Making the Geographic Turn: Herman Moll's 18th-Century Maps

Exemplifying the idea that British history was, and is, deeply implicated with the non-indigenous, Moll was a German immigrant³⁵ who had an elegant engraving style. His visually rich maps contained scenes, views, allegorical figures, topographic information, wind currents, political divisions, and notations on politics, culture, economics, and natural resources. Ogborn begins his book with a brief gloss of *A New Map of the Whole World*, first published by Moll in *Atlas Minor* (1727). He argues that this map offers a view of world geography “ordered by the trade winds” and allegorical male figures who represented four continents bound together “by trade, war, money, power and pain.”³⁶ However, Moll’s most famous maps come from his massive atlas, *The World Described*, first published in 1709 but released in several expanded editions throughout Moll’s life and after, and it is to three of these maps that we turn: a 1719 world map on a Mercator projection,³⁷ a 1715 map of the West Indies,³⁸ and a 1717 map of the East Indies.³⁹

The 1719 world map provides a good teaching context for the other maps and it has properties that can be used to intrigue students and stimulate discussion. First, it contained all of the allegorical figures mentioned by Ogborn. They are in a cartouche in the upper-left corner of the map. Students could be asked to examine the cartouche and unpack its meaning. There is a great deal on display. Power and revelation descended from a sun with Yahweh spelled in Hebrew letters on it. All the allegorical figures were male except the figure at the upper right who was the Roman goddess Fortuna dispensing a cornucopia, a crown, and shackles, symbols

³⁵ There has been some dispute regarding Moll’s national origins. Dennis Reinhartz provides good evidence that Moll was German rather than Dutch. See Dennis Reinhartz, *The Cartographer and the Literati: Herman Moll and his Intellectual Circle* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellon Press, 1997), 11-18.

³⁶ Ogborn, *Global Lives*, 1.

³⁷ An expandable version of this map suitable for use in the classroom is available for download from the Norman B. Leventhal Map Center at the Boston Public Library at <http://maps.bpl.org/id/17055>.

³⁸ An expandable version of this map is available for download at <http://maps.bpl.org/id/17063>.

³⁹ An expandable version of this map is available for download at <http://maps.bpl.org/id/17058>.



Herman Moll, *A New & Correct Map of the Whole World* (1719)
 Source: Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain, No Known Restrictions under Copyright Law

of abundance, sovereignty, and subjection, to people below her. A male lawgiver sat in the upper-left quadrant with his hand on an *Ouroboros* (a “tail devouring snake”), a pagan symbol of eternal return and nature’s cycles of rebirth. From left to right the men in the foreground were allegorical representations of the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa. All were muscular and bore arms: the American and African held bows and arrows, the Turk had a sheathed sword, and the European a sheathed sword and a musket. The men of America and Africa were scantily clad while the European is dressed (anachronistically) as a Roman and Asia was represented by a richly attired Turk. While the Turks were an imperial people whose capital, Istanbul, was a former Roman and Byzantine imperial capital, the only imperial symbol, Roman armor, was tellingly reserved for the European. Placement was important: based on material culture as represented by dress, “primitive” peoples occupied the periphery while the “civilized” world

held the center of the scene. The cartouche invited the viewer to imagine these peoples residing on the regional landmasses depicted on the map's two-dimensional surface.

Moll engraved the map using a Mercator projection. That is significant because it gave the map a strong oceanic orientation and Moll noted in the title cartouche that he chose that projection for its utility to travelers, "to make [the map] Useful both for Land and Sea." Sailors preferred a Mercator projection because it makes plotting ocean voyages relatively easy due to its ability to represent lines of constant course (rhumb lines or loxodromes) as straight lines on the map. Directly below the title cartouche Moll engraved a chart set off in a box that showed variations in magnetic compass readings around the world. The amount of variation or "declination" of magnetic north from true (geographic) north depended on one's location on the globe.⁴⁰ Such variation could cause navigators to sail off course. The inset chart contained data provided by the scientist Sir Edmond Halley (of Halley's Comet fame) from a 1699/1700 voyage he undertook in the Atlantic and data from a voyage by the privateers Woodes Rogers and William Dampier across the Pacific in 1709/10. Moll's inset showed, starting at zero and separated by five degrees, the lines of magnetic variation on the world's major oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian). Depending on one's location, the variance could be as much as thirty degrees. A *fleur-de-lis* atop compass roses near the bottom of the main map pointed in the direction of true North. In addition, on the main map, Moll engraved the westward route Rogers/Dampier took from Cabo San Lucas in Mexico to Guam, showing the magnetic variation they reported along the route they sailed searching for Spanish treasure galleons to plunder.

⁴⁰ The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration website explains that "Magnetic declination, sometimes called magnetic variation, is the angle between magnetic north and true north. Declination is positive east of true north and negative when west. Magnetic declination changes over time and with location." See <http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/geomag/declination.shtml> (accessed January 15, 2015). Moll's map did not indicate that declination changed over time.

Moll explained in his title cartouche that he drew the map to show the location of the world's "Oceans, Kingdoms, Rivers, Capes, Ports, Mountains, Woods, and Trade Winds, Monsoons, Variations of ye Compass, Climates, etc." As in the map referenced by Ogborn, Moll engraved fine sweeping lines to indicate what he calls "general trade winds" or the easterly trade winds on either side of the Equator in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The "easterlies" were the prevailing wind pattern around the Equator and he engraved arrows within them to indicate the general direction (from the northeast north of the Equator and from the southeast south of the Equator) in which the winds blew. They appeared as a dark band about two-thirds of the way down the map. He did not show the "westerlies" which were the prevailing winds north and south of the trade winds. Together, the easterlies and the westerlies allowed European ships to leave and return to Europe, and thus circulate around the globe, via wind power alone. He did show the monsoon or what he calls "shifting trade winds" by arrows pointing northeast and southwest in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and off the coast of East Africa. Moll explained in a notation at the bottom of the map that the arrows indicated the direction of the wind and the months next to them identified the time of year they blew in that direction: northeast (generally winter, October through March) and southwest (generally summer, April through September). Such knowledge was crucial for merchants and seamen planning voyages in the Indian Ocean basin and South China Sea since wind patterns there were quite different from those in the Atlantic waters Europeans knew so well.

To enhance the map's utility, Moll engraved a trapezoidal graph below Madagascar whose purpose was to help viewers find the distance between any two places on the map in English Leagues. An English League was approximately three nautical miles and a nautical mile was 6,076 feet. To the right of the graph Moll incised a long explanation on how to use it. The

engraved graph, allegorical figures, trade winds, and magnetic declinations show that Moll visualized the world as an epistemic whole, a totality that the British navy and merchant marine could access via the world's oceans and their general meteorological regularities.⁴¹ Following cartographic conventions that showed little concern for consistency, Moll also showed a segmented globe and inserted borders between nations and peoples based on independent political status (France, Mughal Empire), dependent colonial status (New Spain, Brazil), or assumed cultural cohesion (Italy, Guinea). These borders provided a politico-cultural order to the map by segmenting landmasses and highlighted as well as normalized territorial claims by great powers in Europe, Asia, America, and Africa. Moll's map depicted a world that was unified and fragmented at the same time, an interconnected world riven by intense and deadly rivalries, a world against and within which Britons developed a national identity, an identity that was not endogenously developed but was intimately related to the exogenous, the "other."⁴²

Those intense and deadly rivalries and the external orientation of British identity get more play on Moll's regional maps. On his world map he identified a place named Caledonia (the Roman name for Scotland) on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus of Panama and on his Map of the West Indies he identified it as New Caledonia with a colony called New Edinburgh. One would not expect to see such names in a region claimed by Spain but it was a large part of a story of colonial and national failure that played a key role in establishing the United Kingdom in 1707. Moll dedicated his map of the West Indies to William Paterson, a founder of the Bank of

⁴¹ See Alex Zukas, "A Kind of Globalization: Merchant Capital, Primitive Accumulation, and the Reconfiguration of World Space in the Maps of Herman Moll, 1700-1730," in *Colonial and Global Interfacings: Imperial Hegemonies and Democratizing Resistances*, eds., Gary Backhaus and John Murungi (Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K.: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 22-57 and Alex Zukas, "Commodities, Commerce, and Cartography in the Early-Modern Era: Herman Moll's World Maps, 1700-1730," in *Global Economies, Cultural Currencies of the Eighteenth Century*, AMS Studies in the Eighteenth Century, No. 64, ed. Michael Rotenberg-Schwartz (New York: AMS Press, 2012), 1-35.

⁴² Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Linda Colley, "Britishness and Otherness: An Argument," *Journal of British Studies* 31, 4 (October 1992): 309-329.

England and a proponent of a Scottish state-sponsored settlement in Panama to serve as a free-trade port through which goods would move overland duty-free between the Atlantic and Pacific



Herman Moll, *A Map of the West Indies* (1720)

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Oceans. The settlement's trans-regional importance was captured by the name of the company that founded it, The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies. The expectations for the colony were huge. It was to be the "Door of the Seas and the key of the universe" enabling "its proprietors to give Laws to both Oceans and to become Arbitrators of the Commercial [sic] world."⁴³ Established in 1698, the colony failed by 1700 due to poor planning and provisioning, divided leadership, lack of trade goods, disease, and, not surprising, Spanish hostility and military action. The company was backed by over a quarter of all the money circulating in Scotland and its failure left the Scottish economy in shambles, a situation that was an important

⁴³ David Armitage, "'The Projecting Age:' William Paterson and the Bank of England," *History Today* (June 1994): 9-10.

factor in overcoming Scottish resistance to English pressure for an Act of Union with England, a move supported by Paterson, and completed in 1707. As part of the deal, England paid off Scotland's debts with the "Equivalent," a sum of £398,000, most of which went to cover investors' losses in the Company of Scotland. While not the only cause of the Act of Union, the modern British nation was as much a product of events overseas as at home.⁴⁴ At a key moment, the world did indeed penetrate deeply into Britain and Moll engraved its traces on his map of the West Indies in the form of place names and a dedication.

Moll and Robert Morden engraved an earlier version of this map in 1702, at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession. The dedicatory cartouche explained that the map showed "what belongs to Spain, England, France, Holland, etc." and showed the circulation of the trade winds and the route of the Spanish silver fleet. It was a map of the West Indian theater of war, European colonial possessions, trade routes that connected those colonies to the wider world, and opportunities to plunder Spanish treasure fleets. Many notations involved information about Spanish-controlled resources coveted by the British, for instance, logwood and silver. Moll depicted the course of the Spanish treasure fleet from its entry into the Caribbean south of Grenada to its stops at Cartagena, Portobelo, and Havana where it met another fleet from Vera Cruz. The combined fleet then sailed between Florida and the Bahamas and into the Atlantic back to Spain. Not content to simply show the route, Moll made extensive notations concerning how the fleet operates and how long it stayed in Cartagena and Portobelo. He provided other logistical information to the viewer in a note across Cuba: "This Island abounds in Beeves and Swine: the Gallions [sic] &c. take in Provision at the Havana for their Voyage to Old Spain." Perhaps as more specific encouragement, northeast of Hispaniola he engraved,

⁴⁴ Douglas Watt, *The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Luath Press Ltd., 2007).

“Here Sir William Phips took up a vast Quantity of Silver from a Spanish Wreck in 1685.”

Completing the map’s fairly aggressive intent, and in case privateers wanted to try their luck, the upper-right hand corner featured the layout, depths, and fortifications of Spain’s four major galleon ports, Vera Cruz, Portobelo, Cartagena, and Havana, with St. Augustine thrown in for good measure as the last Spanish town with a garrison and safe harbor that the silver fleet passed on its way into the Atlantic and relative safety from privateer and pirate attacks.

Moll provided information about the location of Spanish-controlled resources with engraved notations about cocoa plantations in Costa Rica, Tabasco, Yucatan, and Chiapas, silver mines in northern New Spain, and sources of dye (indigo, cochineal, silvester) in the west of Guatemala and in Yucatan (logwood). Cocoa for chocolate and dyes for textiles were highly coveted ingredients in the production of consumer goods. Spain and its colonies in the West Indies were clearly the target of this map and in the lower left corner of the map was an expansive view of Mexico City as the vice-regal capital and the seat of Spanish power in New Spain (modern Mexico). To see why Moll highlighted imperial rivalries and the movement of silver in his map of the West Indies we need to turn to another of his regional maps, that of the other Indies in the east.

With a highly developed commercial economy, India, not Britain, was the manufacturing center of the world before 1800, especially in textiles, with Madras as one of three major centers of production,⁴⁵ and the first items that catch the attention of a viewer are the oversized views of five ports on the left-hand edge of Moll’s map of the East Indies: they took up over a fifth of the

⁴⁵ K. N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the East India Company, 1660-1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Satish Chandra, “Introduction,” in *The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics*, ed. Satish Chandra (New Delhi: SAGE, 1987); Burton Stein, “Eighteenth Century India: Another View,” *Studies in History* (new series), 5 (1989):1-26; Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 84-92, 127-129, 211-218; Robert B. Marks, *The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 51, 96-97.
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map's surface. Their sheer visual size indicates their importance. From the top they were Banten (Dutch protectorate), Goa (Portuguese), Surat (Mughal), Madras (British), and Batavia (Dutch), the trading strongholds of major powers in the Indian Ocean basin.⁴⁶ Acknowledging its centrality to the Indian Ocean economy, Moll made an extensive notation about only one port, the commercially dominant Mughal port of Surat on the west coast of India: "The Town of Surat is of ye Greatest Trade and Note in India. The Staple for all the Commodities of Europe, India, and China, and has English, French, and Dutch Factories." These heavily fortified ports, and the scores of other European "factories" that dotted the coastline of India and the islands of the Indian Ocean, attested to the vibrant and extensive trade that had long been a hallmark of the Indian Ocean basin. These entrepôts allowed Europeans, and to a growing extent the British, to tap into and capture some of that trade for their own aggrandizement and to satisfy the increasing demands of their domestic markets. Given their renewed political power and legal monopoly on British trade with the East Indies, it is not surprising that Moll dedicated this map to the directors of the United East India Company. Like his map of the West Indies, it presented a snapshot of European commercial-imperial rivalry and assertion. The dedicatory cartouche stated that the map showed "what belongs to England, Spain, France, Holland, Denmark, Portugal, &c." and included "many remarks not extant in any other Map."

The remarks or notations were far more extensive than anything on the map of the West Indies and literally "peppered" the map. Most were short notations stating which European power controlled which "factory" or enclave (e.g., "Bombay English," "Rigepour French Factory for Pepper," "Carwar English Factory for Pepper"). More extensive notations described the location of natural resources like pearl banks, diamond mines, other precious stones, gold, silver,

⁴⁶ For a detailed analysis of the view of Madras teachers can refer to Zukas, "Globalization" 44-47, and, for the other cities, Alex Zukas, "The Cartography of Herman Moll and European Views of Muslim South Asia, 1700-1730." *Journal of World History* 25, nos. 2-3 (June 2014): 311-339, especially 323-326.
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camphor, frankincense, ambergris, cloves, nutmeg, mace, and pepper as well as manufactured goods like sugar, tin, iron, silks, and cotton calicoes. For instance, he mentions “Masulapatan. In this city they stain Calicoes [sic] the best of any in ye Indies.” All of these commodities had prominence in Moll’s map which in many places took on the appearance of inventories elegantly engraved across lands and oceans.

The consummate cartographic entrepreneur, Moll created maps that would appeal to a broad educated audience. His maps provide good evidence that the Britons of his day defined themselves in relation to and in contrast with other peoples. They looked out to see what was within. Considering the notations, views, landforms, ocean basins, routes, wind patterns, magnetic declination, and cartouches on all three maps provides students with an educated, early 18th-century sensibility regarding Britain’s relation to the wider world. That sensibility understood that the relation was one of interdependence, not one of diffusion of British achievements to the wider world. It was aware that the global circulation of silver and other commodities sustained the British economy and wove its American and Asian colonies into an economic whole.⁴⁷ Berg argues that “Indian textiles and Spanish American silver... bound the whole system together... cotton textiles also provided the currency for the Africa trade” and “this global integration of consumer markets and producers predated classic British technological and industrial achievements.”⁴⁸ Inverting the usual narrative, the British achieved was she calls “an Asian success story” initiated by “greater access to Asian consumer societies.”⁴⁹

Making the Geographic Turn in the Classroom: Teaching with Herman Moll’s Eighteenth-Century Maps

⁴⁷ Frank, *ReOrient*, 63-130, 177; Marks, *Origins*, 70-71, 99; Stern, “British Atlantic,” 697-707.

⁴⁸ Berg, “Globalization,” 337.

⁴⁹ Berg, “Pursuit,” 86-88, 94, 96-99, 103, 112-116, 123, 130.

Used in conjunction with the new historical research outlined in this article, Moll's maps can assist British secondary schools in their initiative to "globalize" their history curriculum and in counteracting British xenophobia by illustrating how much of what is considered endogenously-driven development in early-modern Britain was, in fact, exogenously stimulated (like the union of England and Scotland and the Industrial Revolution). Together the new research and Moll's maps show that the global world not only included Britain but was *in* Britain for longer than previously understood and that the development of Britain was neither linear nor teleological and was to some extent the unexpected result of failure (in Panama and in handicraft textile production). Without homogenizing or flattening historical experience, this research, provides increasingly strong evidence that changes and experiences in one nation or region are best understood in terms of its connection within the larger world does not support an isolationist view of early-modern British history nor do Moll's maps. They also do not support a view of world history driven primarily by British developments and diffused outward.

Expandable digital versions of Moll's maps can be downloaded from the Leventhal Map Library and the exceptional details that can be brought into focus make them excellent teaching and instructional aids at the secondary and collegiate levels because their visual aesthetics and sweep grab students' attention and provide a window into the mental geography of historical actors. When used in lectures and discussions, they can help students visualize and retain abstract concepts or relationships presented in the research cited in this article and in course readings or lectures. Since these maps are primary sources in their own right, teachers can use deploy them as such in the classroom to support or cast doubt on different historians' arguments. Teachers could use the maps to consider how early-modern Britons, like the Scottish investors and colonists in Panama, had a global vision of commerce and empire. Students could see how

wind patterns shaped trade circuits between and within the world's major oceans and the timing of voyages, adding geographic depth and texture to their understandings. Students could be asked or instructor show how the map shows an active wind powered, rather than a static, globe. One could ask students how the risks associated with long-distance oceanic travel were construed as manageable and less fearsome in Moll's depiction of a global geography structured by trade winds, magnetism, and allegorical figures. Teachers could ask students their thoughts about the role of maps like Moll's in promoting British expansion and engagement with the world and in showing the impact of that engagement on British identity and development. Having students puzzle out the maps' content and style in relation to course readings can enrich both and bring the history of Britain and the early-modern world into creative dialogue. In the end, Moll's map makes it easy for students to visualize Britain in relation to rest of world in the way that people in Moll's day did.⁵⁰

This article has outlined the benefits of a "geographic turn" for "globalizing" the history curriculum in Britain. That might seem fairly intuitive but only recently have historians of Britain begun to look closely at the spatial dimension of British history as an explicit object of research but the article also argues that maps, as powerful visual primary sources, provide teachers a way to convey that research to students in a fashion that will pique their attention and interest, awaken their historical curiosity, and enhance their understanding. Moll's maps invite students, teachers, and researchers to embrace a global approach to topics in British history that enriches that history's content and accuracy by seeing reciprocity between the global and the national. In this approach Britain becomes a participant in, rather than the end of, history and does not lose its identity - it enhances it. Echoing the University of Birmingham's position, a

⁵⁰ For more teaching ideas using Moll's maps see Alex Zukas, "Maps as Commodities in Modern World History," *World History Bulletin*, XXVIII, 2 (fall 2012): 26-31.

more historically adequate view approaches the history of Britain not in isolation or as a prime mover but as a “nodal point in dynamic systems of transnational and global exchange.”